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Hume's Humanity and the Protection of the Vulnerable / Zagorac, Ivana.

By: Zagorac, Ivana.
Material type: materialTypeLabelArticlePublisher: 2015Description: 189-203.Other title: Hume's Humanity and the Protection of the Vulnerable [Naslov na engleskom:].Subject(s): 6.01 | David Hume, humanity, justice, vulnerability, protection of the vulnerable | David Hume, humanity, justice, vulnerability, protection of the vulnerableOnline resources: Click here to access online | Click here to access online In: Diametros 44 (2015) ; str. 189-203Summary: It is well known that Hume excluded inferior rational beings, who are incapable of resistance and weak resentment, from his concept of justice. This resulted in a critique of Hume’s theory of justice, as it would not protect those who were the most vulnerable against ill treatment. The typical answer to this critique is that Hume excluded inferior rational beings from the concept of justice, but not from that of morality, and that he considered their protection to be the task of humanity. The subject of this text is the range of Hume’s humanity. What manner of protection does Hume’s humanity truly offer? Despite the conclusion that this manner of protection of the vulnerable is insufficient, Hume’s humanity contains valuable characteristics worthy of re- evaluation in modern debate – both on the limits of humanity and on the conditions and models of protecting the vulnerable.
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This research was supported under Marie Curie Newfelpro funding sheme for the project CONVINce-ME (FP7-PEOPLE-2011-COFUND program ; Government of the Republic of Croatia and the Ministry of Science, Education and Sport). Author is a CONVINce-ME project manager and a research fellow at the Institute for Medical Ethics and History of Medicine, Ruhr University Bochum.

It is well known that Hume excluded inferior rational beings, who are incapable of resistance and weak resentment, from his concept of justice. This resulted in a critique of Hume’s theory of justice, as it would not protect those who were the most vulnerable against ill treatment. The typical answer to this critique is that Hume excluded inferior rational beings from the concept of justice, but not from that of morality, and that he considered their protection to be the task of humanity. The subject of this text is the range of Hume’s humanity. What manner of protection does Hume’s humanity truly offer? Despite the conclusion that this manner of protection of the vulnerable is insufficient, Hume’s humanity contains valuable characteristics worthy of re- evaluation in modern debate – both on the limits of humanity and on the conditions and models of protecting the vulnerable.

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